A Deep dive into why Arsenal are the best defensive team in the world

Arsenal’s 2022/2023 Premier League campaign was a surprise to the masses. Many expected the Gunners to be battling it out for a place in Europe’s top flight, but instead, the North Londoners went toe to toe with Pep Guardiola’s Manchester City for the title. Mikel Arteta’s men produced exceptional performance levels, accumulating 50 points after the first 19 league games, giving Gooners a glimmer of hope that the unthinkable could just happen.

Sadly injuries to star defender William Saliba and Takehiro Tomiyasu against Sporting CP led to the initiation of cracks that propagated drastically as the season passed by, hampering the functionality of Arsenal’s press and their previously stable rest defence. This was worsened more by Manchester City’s classic ‘business end of the season’ form the Premier League has become accustomed to in the Guardiola era.

The ‘on paper’ collapse in North London provided opposition fanbases and pundits with sufficient ammunition to suggest that Arsenal’s rise to the top was simply a prolonged purple patch. In other words, sheer luck.

But the reality is that Gooners who were able to attenuate external noise and dive deeper into the key details understood that this wasn’t a one-off. The Arteta project has been on an upward trajectory ever since Emile Smith Rowe’s inclusion into the starting eleven on Boxing Day 2020. A key reference point as the Hale End Graduate’s profile is exactly what Arsenal lacked at the time; a tailored presence between the lines, which enabled the Spanish tactician to deviate away from the hybrid 3-4-3 set-up that brought success in the 2020 FA Cup but possessed unstable growth.

Both through numerical data and the human eye, Arsenal’s progression has been sustainable for some time now and this season’s form has validated this argument, as they sit deservedly top of the Premier League ahead of Manchester City and Liverpool with ten games remaining. In doing so, Arteta’s men are at least in the top three in the division for all the key metrics at this time of writing. From Expected Goals (xG) to Expected Goals Against (xGA) to Pressures per Defensive Action (PPDA) and beyond, the Gunners are performing at an incredible level both on and off the ball, with the latter being the primary focus of this article.

Arsenal’s adaptable Out of Possession (OOP) approach in the press, tailored to the opposition, has been key in reducing the potential risk of burnout towards the latter stages of the season whilst ensuring its effectiveness isn’t impeded.

To demonstrate this, wins against title rivals Guardiola and Jurgen Klopp in the Community Shield and Premier League will be used.

Wembley delight

The diagram below shows the two nominal formations utilised, with Manchester City adopting a 4-4-2/4-2-4 shape whilst Arsenal favoured the 4-3-3.

Guardiola found great success against Arsenal’s press at the Etihad last time out through their ‘Roberto De Zerbi’ like stylistic build-up. The Spaniard’s 2-4-4 structure (excluding the goalkeeper) gave the Citizens the platform to bait the Gunners into engaging before executing quick wall passes and finding advantageous spaces present behind the last line.

Arsenal were guilty of falling into these well-calculated traps set by Guardiola, which was exploited to full effect by transition monsters Erling Haaland and Kevin De Bruyne. Granted a backline containing Rob Holding was never going to give Arteta’s men a substantial chance of securing a desirable result, but there were aspects Arsenal could have done better regardless of the lineup.

In life, however, sometimes exposure to the toughest of moments is necessary for growth and the Community Shield performance demonstrated how Arteta used the Etihad nightmare as a valuable learning experience.

The diagram below shows Manchester City’s build-up shape against Arsenal’s press. The initial takeaway is that the immediate Man-to-Man (M2M) network advocated predominantly throughout last season wasn’t on show. There was greater emphasis on a combination of zonal and M2M schemes, something that has been a regular feature this season.

Immediately what‘s apparent is the clear overload in numbers (numerical superiority) Manchester City have in the first phase (5 v 4 or 6 v 4 with goalkeeper Stefan Ortega). The key detail to keep in mind is Arsenal reacting proactively to the positioning of Rodri. The Spanish international is the best holding midfielder in the world in possession. When facing play, his ability to dictate, break lines centrally and isolate the wingers 1 v 1 against the full-backs with diagonal switches is bettered by none.

To mitigate this threat, when Rodri was positioned in the midfield line alongside Mateo Kovacic, the non-negotiable was to not allow him to turn and face play. Declan Rice, who is the best midfielder in the world OOP, was therefore tasked with neutralising Rodri’s on-the-ball qualitative superiority.

Wall passes are fine. Rodri is allowed to execute them. But he cannot have time on the ball in the middle of the park.

Kai Havertz’s role was complex. His primary duty was to curve his run from ‘out to in’ to try and force Ortega to shift play towards the left. The logic behind this is that Ruben Dias’ ball-playing abilities are weaker than John Stones’ and Manuel Akanji, operating at left-back, is naturally right-footed which makes progression through the left-hand side harder for the Citizens.

But in situations where Ortega was able to play the entry ball into Rodri, who can then only deliver a wall pass into Stones due to the pressure applied by Rice, Havertz had to quickly respond and prevent the England international from driving forward, which is what he does in this sequence.

With Stones operating wide, the key was for Havertz to not jump and pressure Ortega too early otherwise the distance between himself and Stones becomes too big, which in turn would give the former Evertonian man time to carry the ball forward unmarked since Gabriel Martinelli is pinned by Kyle Walker.

The moment the ball reaches the flanks, that’s the trigger for Arsenal to form a ‘cage of suffocation’ and press M2M in the wide spaces. Julian Alvarez drops deep and shows for the ball but is immediately pressured by Gabriel Maghalaes. Arsenal’s Brazilian powerhouse fouls the 24-year-old but the main takeaway is the Gunners preventing Manchester City from generating a promising situation through the process of patience, timing and gradually increasing the intensity once certain triggers are signalled.

The other point worth mentioning is that whilst the wide areas are marked aggressively M2M, Arsenal ensure that their zonal network across certain spaces remains intact, which is vital to successfully counter the sheer qualitative threat of individuals like Erling Haaland. William Saliba and Gabriel have established arguably the best centre-back partnership across Europe (cooperative superiority) and were tasked with keeping the Norwegian at bay. But in situations like the one illustrated above, Gabriel is forced to jump on Alvarez, which is the trigger for Thomas Partey to support Saliba (not in the diagram), thereby ensuring the numerical overload at the back remains. This is a classic example of ‘when X moves here, Y must respond, when A moves here, B must respond and so on.’

Manchester City however under the stewardship of Guardiola are quick to find solutions. As mentioned already, a large portion of ball progression is reliant on Rodri so for his influence to increase, he would situationally step into the defensive line at Central Centre Back (CCB) in an attempt to bait Arsenal players into engaging. In response to this, Rice would instead sit off and retreat because the distance between himself and Partey needed not to be large enough that leaves the Ghanaian on an island in the engine room.

Therefore, Rodri dropping into the backline allowed him to receive and face play, which resulted in Arsenal dropping into a proactive mid-block, with two crucial intentions. The first was to prevent the Citizens from accessing dangerous central zones (i.e. zone 14) and the second was to force Manchester City to shift play towards Akanji and this can be shown below, with Havertz and Martin Odegaard both orientating their body shape accordingly.

Once Akanji receives the ball wide, this is the trigger to increase the intensity, which is what star boy Bukayo Saka does. The angles are unfavourable to Akanji in this role, who is forced to pass back to Dias due to the pressure applied by Saka. Backwards passes that are rushed provoke pressure and Arsenal latch onto this opportunity by deviating away from the mid-block and squeezing upfield as a unit.

Similarly to the aforementioned sequence described earlier, as Arsenal restore their pressing shape, Havertz curves his run from ‘out to in’ to push Ortega into making a decision. With no short passing option available to the Manchester City goalkeeper, the German has no choice but to go long.

Notice the structure in place at the back as Arsenal look to compete for the first and second ball (diagram below). The 2 v 1 overload between the two centre-backs and Haaland is present, with Partey available to sweep up. Whilst Manchester City’s number 9 wins the first duel under pressure from Saliba, Partey is there to collect the crucial second ball because of the numerical superiority present. Well-calculated, risk-averse and with strong levels of adaptability; Arsenal’s strategy was smart and efficient.

See below for another example. Rodri initially starts at CCB (trigger for the mid-block) before moving into the midfield line. Notice Rice who, instead of sitting in the same horizontal line as Partey, steps up to prevent the 27-year-old from receiving and turning. Martinelli in these scenarios dropped slightly more inside to prevent Alvarez from finding sufficient space in the pockets whilst also being mindful that he would need to quickly collapse wide if Walker received the ball.

Rice’s OOP qualities have been the driving force behind Arsenal becoming the best defensive team in the world at this time of writing. The 24-year-old’s controlled aggression and ability to time tackles by using his long legs to his advantage is as good as anyone. Rice’s dominant frame allows him to dispossess his marker both in deeper areas when utilised as a 6 or upfield when deployed as a highly energetic pressing number 8. The diagrams below showcase the latter, with Rice being quicker in both the mind and also in the action once Rodri receives the ball from Ortega (dynamic superiority).

There were situations in which Manchester City did provoke M2M pressing scenarios across all zones from Arsenal, particularly when the distance between Rodri and Kovacic increased. Typically, Odegaard would shadow-cover Kovacic whilst pressing Dias when the Portuguese central defender received the ball from Ortega, with Rice then moving to Kovacic and Havertz man-marking Rodri. The pendulum-like movement and differing responsibilities Rice and Havertz held worked efficiently when Rodri and Kovacic were within proximity, but this was disrupted when Kovacic started higher or wider as the distance Rice had to travel between the two pivot players was too large relative to the speed of play.

So to prevent Kovacic from receiving in space, Partey would step up, which meant that Saliba and Gabriel were M2M at the back against Haaland and Alvarez (not in the diagram).

As Dias delivers the ball to Jack Grealish, White stays touch tight to the former Aston Villa playmaker and with the ‘cage of suffocation’ formed, Arsenal can pressure Manchester City players into submission before winning it back.

As shown in this sequence, whilst Guardiola’s team may have forced Arsenal to press M2M across all zones, it isn’t something the Gunners are new to given that it was a staple to their OOP methods in advanced areas from last season. They can deal with these situations with such authority because of the versatility and athletic prowess of Saliba and Gabriel. Their ability to hold the highest of lines, dominate the channels 1 v 1 and recover positionally to deal with electric forwards gives Arteta a plethora of flexibility. Basically in layman’s terms, if Arsenal need to go M2M, they will do with success.

Granted there were moments in which Arsenal lost discipline, with the build-up to Cole Palmer’s goal an example to illustrate this as well as other isolated moments where Aaron Ramsdale was called into action. But to concede an xG of just under 1 (0.95) over 90 minutes is enough evidence to suggest that Arsenal’s OOP strategy was effective, just like it was at the Emirates in the Gunners’ 1-0 win against the Citizens, where they adopted similar tactics but with added aggression due to the absence of Rodri, conceding an xG of 0.65 in the process.

Similarly, Arsenal have found success against their other title rivals, Liverpool, taking four points off the Reds in the league. What’s interesting is the contrast in pressing style relative to the Manchester City fixtures, with the Gunners favouring the immediate ‘from the get-go’ M2M schematic from last season.

Dominance at the carpet

Shown below are the two formations Arteta and Klopp used in February’s high-octane encounter, with both managers favouring the nominal 4-3-3 structure.

Arsenal adopted the mindset of pressing M2M because they saw Liverpool possessing significant weaknesses in build-up that could be capitalised on.

Generally speaking, pressing entirely M2M relies upon qualitative superiorities spread across the pitch. The ability to consistently win individual duels is imperative for this tactic to work. It’s incredibly rewarding as it’s a strong aid for clear-cut chance creation but there are associated risks involved.

All it takes is for one player to lose their 1 v 1 battle and cracks appear, as it leads to teammates stepping out to support, which in turn leaves other previously occupied opposition players unmarked. In other words, it can create a crippling ripple effect.

For example, last season’s 3-0 defeat to Brighton & Hove Albion showed how Arsenal’s M2M press in the second half was exploited by De Zerbi’s side. On the day, Japanese international Karou Mitoma managed to get the better of Ben White, which eventually resulted in the Seagulls finding regular inroads through Arsenal’s right-hand side before generating several glorious opportunities.

However when each player can outshine their marker, using M2M pressing fundamentals offers complete control, as demonstrated against Liverpool.

The diagram below shows the Reds’ 2-4-4 build-up shape (excluding goalkeeper Alisson Becker) in action. A similar structure to the one predominantly deployed by Manchester City in the Community Shield, but notice how each Liverpool outfield player is marked.

Arsenal’s M2M press had two key aims. The first was to prevent the classic Virgil Van Dijk switch that isolates Liverpool’s right winger against the full-back. Granted Mohamed Salah wasn’t available but Cody Gakpo 1 v 1 is still a threat to Oleksandr Zinchenko, who struggles defending deep without support in a fixed position. Odegaard would therefore press ‘in to out’ to prevent the angle at which Van Dijk could deliver the long diagonal pass with his favoured right foot.

The second aim was to bait the Liverpool backline into giving the ball to Joe Gomez. The 26-year-old isn’t comfortable using his left foot in confined spaces, which makes progression down the channel much more difficult for him when placed under pressure.

Notice how Saka’s starting position is withdrawn in the right half-space as he wants Van Dijk to give possession to his teammate. In any given scenario where Gomez receives the ball, he is pressed in a way that forces him to use his weaker left foot.

In this instance however, the Liverpool skipper chooses not to pass to Gomez and with no other short passing options available, he’s forced to go direct down the channel. Arsenal are happy for Van Dijk to deliver balls down the flank as it gives the backline opportunities to compete for first and second balls within a compact structure.

As the Dutchman plays it long, White remains aggressive on Luis Diaz before nipping in front and dispossessing the Colombian international.

The next example shows Liverpool players rotating in build-up, with Gomez inverting alongside Alexis Mac Allister and Curtis Jones holding the width. But as previously mentioned, whenever Gomez was on the ball, the aim was to press even harder in the hope of forcing a turnover. Rice recognises that the Liverpool number two becomes his man, so he presses ‘in to out’ to force him onto his left peg. With Arsenal quick to then form their ‘cage of suffocation’, Gomez is eventually pressured into executing a loose pass that Saka latches onto.

The Gunners throughout the first half in particular were able to stifle Liverpool in build-up and generate a handful of promising opportunities through their counter press. It played a crucial part in Arsenal producing a total xG of 3.76 whilst constraining Liverpool to the bare minimum (0.41 xG).

It was a game of utter domination and illustrated just how adaptable Arsenal are. They can easily deploy the OOP principles that were present from the previous campaign prior to Saliba’s injury. But as illustrated in the Community Shield alongside other games against Brighton, Manchester United and Newcastle at the Emirates from the current season, Arsenal are capable of utilising different methods to achieve the same outcome.

Arteta is a pragmatic coach. He’s obsessed with the specifics and ensuring his team has the platform to capitalise on any given fine margin relative to the opponent. From build up, to the press, to throw-ins, set pieces, etc; the former club captain takes pride in identifying every single detail. But he will not move away from the principles of play that shape his philosophy. That is non-negotiable. It’s a healthy blend of proactiveness and stubbornness that allows his players to be tactically ready to combat various game states they may face.

Data crunch

Arsenal pass the eye test with flying colours. They are the best team in the division defensively and the numbers support this claim.

Very early in the article, it was mentioned that Arsenal’s adaptable OOP approach has ‘been key in reducing the potential risk of burnout towards the latter stages of the season whilst ensuring its effectiveness isn’t impeded.’  

To expand on this point, there has essentially been greater emphasis on the conservation of energy. But what’s important to note is that this hasn’t come at the expense of the pressing effectiveness, as shown in the diagram below, courtesy of @DataAnalyticEPL.

The graph provides a correlation between the intensity of the press and PPDA. In comparison to other sides across the division, many teams show more aggression than Arsenal, but no club betters them at disrupting build-up, with Arteta’s men conceding the fewest number of passes before a defensive action is made.

An abundance of efficiency, but it doesn’t just stop at the press. They’ve conceded the lowest xG (19.4) in the league at this time of writing, ahead of Manchester City who are ranked 2nd with an xG of 27.6.

What makes this statistic even more impressive is the squeeze Arsenal apply weekly, pinning teams deep inside their half. This is illustrated in the graphic below, (produced by @CurranBoP) which compares the field tilt of each team in the division with respect to their league position.

‘Field tilt is a metric to show the territorial dominance between teams. It measures the share of possession a team has in a game, considering only touches or passes in the attacking third.’ In other words, it’s a great way of understanding the quality and purpose of possession.

What’s shown in the chart is that only Manchester City (73.8) are marginally better than the Gunners (73.6) on this front so one would think that the north Londoners would surely be suspect to transitions given how high they hold their line.

But they actually allow the fewest number of shots per game, whilst also conceding the lowest xG per attempt the opponent has. The graphic below offers greater clarity.

The impact can be placed primarily on Saliba, Gabriel and Rice, who are all big space athletes that thrive in duels and offer excellent security to Arsenal’s rest defence. The graphic below, by @StatsBomb, further exemplifies these points, which shows each shot a team has had between the 1st of January (post-Fulham away) and the 24th of February (pre-Sheffield United away).

Notice the incredibly low number of zone 14 entries leading to shots Arsenal have conceded, which demonstrates the strong levels of central compactness in place within the structure.

David Raya’s influence shouldn’t go unnoticed. The on-loan Brentford keeper endured a turbulent start to life in north London, with Gooners questioning the need for his acquisition. But the 28-year-old’s performances post-Luton away have been nothing short of superb, showcasing a range of qualities such as increasing the versatility of Arsenal’s build-up by being comfortable at centre-back, exceptional cross-claiming skills, sweeping prowess, kickstarting transitions through his proactive mindset and outstanding long-range kicking that enables the Gunners to go over the top of the press and win second balls consistently upfield.

Raya has offered a level of calmness that has further enhanced the control Arsenal operate with. His presence, alongside Rice, Saliba and Gabriel gives Arsenal a robust defensive spine. When assessing the skillset of these individuals, coupled with the versatility and reliability of the ever-present Ben White, alongside the pressing intelligence of Odegaard, Saka, Havertz, Martinelli, etc, it becomes a lot easier to understand why Arsenal are the best in the league OOP.

Final Thoughts

Arteta is elite tactically. It’s undeniable. The question marks revolve around squad management and that will dictate the outcome of the season. With high-octane games coming thick and fast that include the likes of Bayern Munich, Manchester City, Manchester United and Spurs, the Spaniard must rotate his squad accordingly whilst ensuring a strong level of continuity remains.

All eyes are on him. The media and opposition fans will be waiting to pounce on any slip-up. If Arsenal don’t pick up a major honour, the ‘bottlers’ narrative will arise yet again.

But remember, perspective is everything. Arsenal have the 2nd youngest squad and the youngest manager in the league. Neither the players nor the coach are close to their peak. They are here to stay for the long run and with further reinforcements to come in the summer, there is no doubt that the Gunners will be securing major trophies sooner rather than later. A project this sustainable cannot fail.

I hope you enjoyed the read and any comments would be much appreciated.

If you would like to know more about me, follow @RjArsenalBlog on X, which is where you can find previous articles and my general opinions.

Statistics/data that haven’t been referenced are courtesy of fbref, @xGPhilosophy and @markrstats.

Formations have been created through the Tactical Board tool.

Rohan Jivan

25-year-old Gooner who loves talking and writing about football